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Note
Passing the Big Bucks: Contractual Transfers of
Liability Between Potentially Responsible
Parties Under CERCLA
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, also re-
ferred to as the Superfund Act)' to establish and fund
enforcement mechanisms for the cleanup of property contain-
ing environmental hazards.2 CERCLA seeks to protect the
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1989)). CERCLA originally was to have expired September 30,
1991, but Congress inserted language into the 1990 omnibus budget package
that reauthorized the Act through the end of fiscal year 1994. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6301, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990); see also Superfund Gets New Lease on Life, Engineering News-Record,
Nov. 8, 1990, at 8 (legislators were not up for another big fight over environ-
mental legislation, having just completed work on the Clean Air Act). The
quick action "short-circuited" what promised to be an intense battle over
reauthorization. Id. EPA officials claimed that without the extension of the
Act, they would have had to begin shutting down the program by early 1991.
Id. Senator Frank Lautenburg of New Jersey, who inserted the extension pro-
vision in the 1990 budget act, said he believed Congress should consider
changes in CERCLA, but "should not let the program grind to a halt" in the
meantime. Congress Wraps It Up: A Drawn-Out Session Permits Last-Minute
Legal Changes, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 12, 1990, at 29. Because of the length of the
extension, many interested parties hope Congress will consider amendments
to the law. Id.
2. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, HAZARD-
ous WASTE CONTAIMENT AcT OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119,
6125; SENATE COMM. ON ENvIRONMENT AND PUBLIc WORKS, ENViRONMENTAL
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AcT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980).
For CERCLA's legislative history, see ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES PoLIcY DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC
WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY AcT OF 1980
(SUPERFUND) (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (re-
printing the legislative history of CERCLA in three volumes); SUPERFUND: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (H. Needham & M. Menefee eds. 1982) (three volumes);
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
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public health by ensuring quick responses3 to the threats posed
by improperly managed hazardous waste sites, by encouraging
the voluntary cleanup of those sites, and by making certain that
those responsible4 bear the costs of cleanup.5 To carry out
these goals, Congress cast a very broad liability net.6
CERCLA was controversial even before its passage in
1980.7 Because the Act was rushed through a lame-duck ses-
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L
1 (1982) (detailing the history of CERCLA).
3. "Response" under CERCLA includes such actions as confinement,
storage, dredging or excavations, and repair or replacement of leaking contain-
ers. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23)-(25) (1988).
4. These parties targeted by Congress include "the key industries of the
modern American postwar industrial economy, including chemical manufac-
turing, petroleum refining, pesticide production, plastics manufacturing, elec-
tronics production, and mining." Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should
Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6 STAN. ENVT L.J. 271, 275 (1986-1987).
5. H.R. REP. No. 1016, pt. 1, supra note 2, at 17, 29, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6119-20, 6132; see also Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn.
1982)) (one of CERCLA's goals is to ensure "that those responsible for
problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and respon-
sibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created"); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 404 '(W.D. Mo. 1985) ("the funda-
mental purpose of CERCLA is to provide for the expeditious and efficacious
cleanup of hazardous waste sites"); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co.,
544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (CERCLA's objective is "to facilitate
the prompt clean up of hazardous dump sites by providing a means of financ-
ing both governmental and private responses and by placing the ultimate fi-
nancial burden upon those responsible for the danger").
6. CERCLA achieves its goals through its strong liability structure.
Note, CERCLA, Successor Liability, and the Federal Common Law: Respond-
ing to an Uncertain Legal Standard, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1237, 1241 (1990). The
liability provisions supply funds to continue the cleanup of hazardous condi-
tions while also deterring improper hazardous-material management. Id.
7. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, pt. 1, supra note 2, at 65, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIw. NEWS 6119, 6141 (Representative William Dan-
nemeyer, expressing general opposition to H.R. 7020, as originally passed by
the House of Representatives, see infra note 9 (discussing CERCLA's voyage
through Congress), remarked that "[w]hen the epitaph is written... for the
inactive hazardous waste site-cleanup bill [H.R. 7020] just reported by the full
Commerce Committee it may well read 'noble of purpose but notorious in op-
eration' "); see also Bayko & Share, Stormy Weather on Superfund Front
Forecast as "Hurricane SARA" Hits, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 24
("[a]lthough there was widespread agreement on the urgent need for funds
and authority to clean up existing hazardous-waste sites, Congress was badly
divided on how to accomplish this task").
In 1979, prior to the passage of CERCLA, both the EPA and Congress be-
lieved that a site could be adequately cleaned up by "scraping a few inches of
soil off the ground." H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 54 (1985);
see also Note, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986: Lim-
1572 [Vol. 75:1571
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sion of Congress" and was the result of a "last minute compro-
mise" between three competing bills,9 it has gained a well-
iting Judicial Review to the Administrative Record in Cost Recovery Actions
by the EPA, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1152, 1155 (1989). Politicians and profession-
als alike had little knowledge regarding the cleanup process and the financial
resources required. Id at 1156.
8. Congress enacted CERCLA on December 11, 1980, just one month af-
ter Ronald Reagan defeated incumbent President Jimmy Carter in the presi-
dential election. Noting that Congress passed the statute during a "lame
duck" administration, former EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle termed
the enactment of a major piece of legislation such as CERCLA "an extraordi-
nary action." 16 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 7 (May 3, 1985).
9. See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902, 905 (D.N.H. 1985)
(Congress passed CERCLA hastily after very limited debate and under a sus-
pension of the rules).
Representative Biaggi introduced H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., on Janu-
ary 15, 1979. 125 CONG. REc. 130 (1979). The three House committees that
considered the bill substituted a new version of the bill and submitted it to the
full House of Representatives with a favorable report. See H.R. REP. No. 172,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-3 (1979-1990). Because of resistance from the oil
and chemical industries, the full House considered and passed a replacement
bill advanced by Representative Breaux as an amendment to H.R. 85. 126
CONG. REc. 26,391-92 (1980). The bill, as passed, established two funds fi-
nanced from taxes on petroleum and chemical feedstocks. One fund was to
provide compensation for oil spills and the other for hazardous chemical spills
in navigable waters; the bill did not encompass hazardous substance releases
on land. The bill permitted governments and individuals to recover damages
for cleanup costs and certain economic losses, and imposed strict liability on
owners and operators of vessels and other facilities.
Representative Florio introduced H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., on April
2, 1980. 126 CONG. REC. 7490 (1980). The bill was reported out of Committee,
see LR. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-2 (1980), and enacted by the
House. 126 CONG. REC. 26,799 (1980). The bill created a fund financed from a
tax on oil and chemicals and from general revenues. The fund was to support
government response to releases of hazardous substances, including oil, from
inactive hazardous waste sites; it did not cover spills in navigable waters, nor
did it provide for compensation for economic losses.
The most ambitious of the bills, S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., was intro-
duced by Senators Culver, Muskie, Stafford, Chafee, Randolph, and Moynihan
on July 11, 1979. 125 CONG. REC. 17,988 (1979). It was favorably reported. See
S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). As reported, the bill provided for
a $4 billion fund from general revenues and fees on petroleum and chemicals,
and for strict liability for a broad range of persons responsible for releases of
hazardous chemicals (not including oil). The liability and compensation provi-
sions covered cleanup costs and a variety of private damages, including medical
expenses.
As all three bills reached the Senate, S. 1480 was attacked as too compre-
hensive and H.R. 85 and H.R. 7020 as too weak. Eventually the Senate passed
a substitute bill as an amendment to H.R. 7020. The new H.R. 7020 was en-
acted by both Houses, and signed into law on December 11, 1980. Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (prior to 1986 amendment). See generally LEG-
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deserved reputation for vaguely-drafted provisions10 and an am-
biguous, often contradictory legislative history.n As a xesult,
the answers to key issues are sometimes obscure.' 2
One such issue is the contractual transfer of liability be-
tween two parties potentially responsible for cleanup costs
under CERCLA's liability provisions.13 For example, Good-
stone, a tire manufacturer, sells a contaminated plant site to
Fireyear, another tire manufacturer that plans to continue to
manufacture tires at the site. The sales contract contains a
clause purporting to indemnify and release Goodstone from all
past and future liability to Fireyear for matters arising out of
the transaction or in respect to the site. Fireyear manufactures
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2; Grad, supra note 2 (detailing CERCLA's de-
velopment and legislative history).
10. Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d
643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) ("CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision").
In fact, during the final House debates, a number of Representatives identified
over forty drafting errors in the bill that became CERCLA. See 126 CONG.
REc. 31,975-76 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Snyder); see also id. at 31,969-70 (re-
marks of Rep. Broyhill listing 22 serious problems with the bill). But see Grad,
supra note 2, at 2 (because of the inadequate knowledge of the effects of haz-
ardous waste on the environment in 1980, CERCLA was perhaps "the best
that could be done at the time").
11. "Although Congress had worked on 'Superfund' toxic and hazardous
waste cleanup bills... for over three years, the actual bill which became law
had virtually no legislative history at all." Grad, supra note 2, at 1. Because
the final bill emerged from floor fights in the Senate where major amend-
ments were made and adopted, the little history available often proves vague
and sketchy. See Garber, Federal Common Law of Contribution Under the
1986 CERCLA Amendments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365, 366 (1987). This point has
not been lost on the courts. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 823 F.2d
977, 980 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 761 F.2d 311,
318 (6th Cir. 1985)); McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp.
1401, 1410 (N.D. Ohio 1987), ojff'd, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1988); Pinole Point
Properties, Inc., v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 287 (N.D. Cal.
1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 1982); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982). For a general discussion of the problems
attendant to construing hastily drafted legislation, see Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 569-71 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Artesian Water, 851 F.2d at 649 (the question of reimburse-
ment for property or income loss was deliberately omitted from CERCLA); see
also Bayko & Share, supra note 7, at 24 n.1.
13. Parties become potentially responsible under CERCLA § 107(a). 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); see infra notes 17-33 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing CERCLA's liability structure). A single party is seldom responsible for
the hazardous waste pollution of a site. Usually, such a site will have numer-
ous potentially responsible parties. See, e.g., United States v. Seymour Re-
cycling Corp., 686 F. Supp. 696, 697 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (more than 350 potentially
responsible parties connected with one site).
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tires at the site in the same fashion as did Goodstone. Some-
time later, Fireyear, aware of hazardous waste problems at the
site and desiring to avoid interaction with the government, vol-
untarily cleans up the site, incurring heavy costs.' 4 Fireyear
files suit against Goodstone seeking to recover from Goodstone
a portion of those cleanup costs.15 Under CERCLA's liability
provisions, both Goodstone and Fireyear are potentially respon-
sible parties liable for the cleanup costs.'8 Nonetheless, can
Goodstone successfully use the purported indemnity and re-
lease to avoid liability?
This Note examines the effect of contractual transfers of li-
ability between potentially responsible parties under CERCLA.
Part I describes CERCLA's liability provisions and discusses
how various courts have dealt with contractual agreements pur-
porting to transfer liability between potentially responsible par-
ties. Part H considers the statutory language, the relevant
legislative history, and the purposes of CERCLA and concludes
that CERCLA prohibits such contractual transfers. This Note
further argues that voiding contractual transfers of CERCLA
liability between potentially responsible parties will not disrupt
commercial expectations. Finally, this Note illustrates the tan-
gible benefits of such an interpretation.
I. THE SCOPE OF CERCLA LIABILITY AND SOME
ATTEMPTS TO AVOID IT
A. OVER iEW OF CERCLA
Under CERCLA, a broadly-defined group of landowners,
transporters, and generators of hazardous waste are potentially
liable for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites.17 The
14. See infra notes 17-33 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's li-
ability structure).
15. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing the method
by which private parties can recover costs from other potentially responsible
parties).
16. Goodstone would be liable as a past owner or operator under
CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988), and Fireyear as a present
owner or operator under CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988).
See infra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Section 107(a) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only
to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section -
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
1991] 1575
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wide scope of CERCLA liability encourages private parties to
remedy problems on existing sites and discourages careless dis-
posal of toxic wastes."'
CERCLA imposes liability in two ways. First, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)19 has the au-
thority to compel responsible parties to clean up a site,20 or it
may clean up the site itself2 l and recover its expenses from
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incinera-
tion vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and contain-
ing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not in-
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
18. AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D.
Ohio 1990) (CERCLA liability serves to "encourage private remedial initia-
tive"); Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 998 (D.N.J. 1988)
(CERCLA liability imposed to remedy serious environmental hazards caused
by negligent hazardous waste disposal practices).
19. The EPA derives its response authority from CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). This section authorizes the President to "take any
... response measure... which the President deems necessary to protect the
public health or welfare or the environment." The President delegates to the
EPA and other administrative agencies the authority to implement CERCLA
through Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 29, 1987), reprinted in
42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1988).
20. See CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). When the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance poses an imminent danger to the
health and welfare of the public, the EPA may require the Attorney General
to initiate an action in federal district court to secure whatever relief is neces-
sary to abate the danger. Id. The EPA may also issue administrative orders
directing private parties to take whatever action is necessary to protect the
public and the environment. The recipient of such an order is not entitled to
judicial review of the order prior to enforcement. Wagner Elec. Corp. v.
Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 740 (D. Kan. 1985).
21. If a party refuses to comply with a cleanup order, the EPA can re-
spond directly and clean up the site. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(a)(1) (1988). The cleanup is financed by the Superfund. See CERCLA
1576
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those parties.22 Second, private parties may recover costs in-
curred in a response action under section 107(a)(4)(B).2 Under
section 107(a)(4)(B), potentially responsible parties may be lia-
ble to any party that incurs response costs.24 Additionally,
under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization.Act of
§ 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(1) (1988) (authorizing reimbursement of re-
sponse costs through Superfund).
22. The EPA can seek reimbursement from potentially responsible par-
ties under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). See
supra note 17.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). See supra note 17.
24. If a potentially responsible party voluntarily cleans up a site prior to
government action, it may recover under § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). See generally Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of Action Under CERCLA, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q.
181, 216-19 (1986) (detailing actions under § 107(a)(4)(B)); Note, Private Cost
Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1135 (1985) (same). To re-
cover, however, all response costs must have been incurred "consistent with
the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). The National Con-
tingency Plan is a detailed set of regulations appearing at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-
300.81, which describes methods of responding to hazardous waste problems
and sets forth guidelines for the appropriate roles of state and federal agencies
and private parties.
Before 1985, courts disagreed over whether private party complaints must
allege and prove EPA approval of the response action. Compare Artesian
Water Co. v. Government of Newcastle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1357-60 (D.
Del. 1985) (requiring prior government approval), qff'd on other grounds, 851
F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) with Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (not requiring federal
preauthorization of private recovery action). In 1985, the EPA revised the Na-
tional Contingency Plan to make it "absolutely clear" that preapproval of a re-
sponse action is not necessary for recovery of costs under CERCLA § 107(a).
EPA 1985 National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan,
50 Fed. Reg. 47,912, 47,934 (1985). The Ninth Circuit subsequently deferred to
the EPA regulation in Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887,
891-92 (9th Cir. 1986).
Some courts have held that the "unclean hands" doctrine may act to bar
private liability actions by potentially responsible parties. See, e.g., Mardan
Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (D. Ariz. 1984), qff'd on
other grounds, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) (district court applied unclean
hands defense as bar to private action between potentially responsible parties;
Ninth Circuit decided case on other grounds and did not address validity of un-
clean hands approach); infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text; see also Vio-
let v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1294-95 (D.R.I. 1986) (in private liability action
under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), because the plaintiff seeks equitable relief, de-
fendants are not barred from asserting equitable defenses).
Other courts, however, have not looked favorably upon the use of the un-
clean hands doctrine as a bar to CERCLA liability actions. In Chemical Waste
Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (E.D. Pa.
1987), the court held that a party liable for response costs may sue other po-
tentially responsible parties under § 107(a)(4)(B) and that the doctrine of un-
clean hands as espoused in Mardan has no place in CERCLA actions. Id. at
n.7; see also United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 404-05
1991] 1577
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1986 (SARA), 25 any party found liable under CERCLA may
seek contribution from any other potentially responsible
party.26
CERCLA section 107(a)27 defines four classes of potentially
responsible parties: current owners and operators of facilities,
past owners and operators at the time of waste disposal, arrang-
ers of hazardous waste transportation and disposal, and trans-
porters of hazardous wastes for disposal.28 The Act imposes
strict liability.29 Parties are liable, regardless of fault, for the
(W.D. Mo. 1985) ("[a]pplication of the unclean hands defense in this context
[CERCLA liability] would turn Congressional intent on its head").
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). The section provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or
following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under sec-
tion 9607(a) of this title. Such claims... shall be governed by Federal
law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court de-
termines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish
the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the ab-
sence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of
this title.
Id.
26. Id. Parties found liable under either § 107(a) or § 106 may seek contri-
bution from other responsible parties. Id. SARA expressly pertains to civil
actions in which the government holds the potentially responsible party liable
under § 106 or § 107(a)(4)(A), or the party is found liable to a private party
under § 107(a)(4)(B). In those cases, the potentially responsible party may
seek contribution from other potentially responsible parties pursuant to
§ 113(f)(1). 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988).
Even before SARA, the majority of federal courts had implied a right to
contribution from either the overall scheme and objectives of CERCLA or
from the federal common law. See Wemer v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F.
Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484,
1492 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-
09 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); see supra note 17.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); see supra note 17.
29. The Act itself does not explicitly state that the strict liability standard
applies, but states that the term "liable" should be interpreted in the same
way as the standard of liability of § 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(b)(3) (1988). CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (" 'liable' or 'lia-
bility' under this subsection shall be construed to be the standard of liability
which obtains under section 1321 of title 33"). Courts concluded that a federal
common law standard was required and that the comparable Clean Water Act
standard was strict liability. See, eg., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem.
Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984). Courts chose a liability rule that
took no account of state law. A uniform rule, they reasoned, would discourage
illegal waste dumping in states having "lax liability laws" and protect from the
vagaries of state law the government's ability to obtain reimbursement for
Superfund expenditures. See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809. The courts also
[Vol. 75:15711578
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costs of cleaning up hazardous substances simply on the basis of
their relationship either to the site contaminated with hazard-
ous substances or to the hazardous substances themselves.30
The liability is also joint and several.3 ' The Act recognizes only
three defenses to liability: an act of God, an act of war, or the
"third party" defense.32 Courts have construed these defenses
narrowly.33
viewed a uniform federal law as consistent with CERCLA's exclusive federal
court jurisdiction and the special federal interest in hazardous waste. See
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ml. 1984);
see also Garber, supra note 11, at 368 (citing A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at
1255; United States v. Stringfellow, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,385,
20,386 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).
30. See Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA
Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1989). As Representative Florio, the
Sponsor of the House version of CERCLA, explained, CERCLA's "strong lia-
bility scheme will insure that those responsible for releases of hazardous sub-
stances will be held strictly liable for costs of response and damages to natural
resources." 126 CONG. REc. 31,964 (1980), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 777.
31. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983). Courts have adopted the joint and several liability formula of the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 433A, 433B, 875, 881 (1979) (setting forth instances where tort law
imposes joint and several liability). Although CERCIA does not expressly im-
pose joint and several liability, such liability carries out Congress's intent by
enabling the government to recover the entire cleanup cost from any liable
party without having to identify all responsible parties. Garber, supra note 11,
at 369; see also Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 n.13 (earlier House and Senate
versions contained language providing for "strict, joint and several liability,"
although this language was removed from CERCLA, "joint and several liabil-
ity.is consistent with the contribution language of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2)").
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). The "third party" defense excuses a po-
tentially responsible party from liability for the acts or omissions of third par-
ties, other than those employed by or under a contractual relationship with
the party claiming the defense, when that party has exercised due care and
taken reasonable precautions. Id. This defense, sometimes referred to as the
innocent landowner defense, is difficult to prove, requiring the landowner to
show that he or she did not know or have reason to know of the presence of
the hazardous substance at the time of purchase, or that the property was ac-
quired through escheat, eminent domain, condemnation, inheritance, or be-
quest. SARA § 101(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988).
For a detailed discussion of the defenses available under CERCLA, see
Developments in the Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1543
(1986) (ch. IV. Affirmative Defenses).
33. See Note, Toward an Optimal System of Successor Liability for Haz-
ardous Waste Cleanup, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 226, 245-46 (1986); see also Shore
Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044-45 (significantly limiting the scope of the "third party"
defense).
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B. CONTRACTUAL TRANSFERS OF CERCLA LIABILITY
Courts are split on the issue of whether a potentially re-
sponsible party can "contract out" of CERCLA liability through
the use of an agreement between itself and another potentially
responsible party.34 Section 107(e) is ambiguous and on its face
provides little guidance on this question.35 Section 107(e)
states:
(1) No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or
conveyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator
of any vessel or facility or from any person who may be liable for a
release or threat of release under this section, to any other person the
liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall
bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to
such agreement for any liability under this section.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter, including the provisions of para-
graph (1) of this subsection, shall bar a cause of action that an owner
or operator or any other person subject to liability under this section,
or a guarantor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation or other-
wise against any person.36
The provision appears expressly to prohibit all contractual
transfers of liability in one sentence, then expressly to allow
them in the next.3 7 As a result of this ambiguity, the interpre-
tations that courts give the provision vary considerably.zs
34. See infra notes 38-63 and accompanying text.
35. See Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1025
(N.D. Cal. 1990); AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525,
528 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1988).
37. See Jones-Hamilton, 750 F. Supp. at 1025 ('This inartfully drafted pro-
vision [§ 107(e)(1)] seems internally inconsistent. The first sentence... ap-
pears to prohibit indemnification agreements under all circumstances while
the second sentence... appears to permit indemnification under all circum-
stances."); infra notes 64-95 and accompanying text (discussing alternate inter-
pretations of § 107(e)(1)).
38. See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th
Cir. 1986) (contractual transfer of CERCLA liability enforceable under New
York law) (discussed infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text); AM Int'l, 743
F. Supp. at 530 (contractual transfer of CERCLA liability between two or
more potentially responsible parties prohibited by § 107(e)) (discussed infra
notes 53-63 and accompanying text); Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co.,
742 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that CERCLA expressly pre-
serves the right of private parties to contractually transfer liability);
Weigmann & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957, 961-62 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (purporting to apply federal law to hold release ineffective where parties
had no knowledge that property contained hazardous waste and could not
have anticipated CERCLA liability because land was conveyed in 1975, five
years before CERCLA took effect); Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696
F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1988) ("[b]y its own terms, CERCLA expressly pre-
serves the right of private parties to contractually transfer to or release an-
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The disparity among the courts is not limited, however, to
whether section 107(e) allows any contractual transfers of lia-
bility. Even among the courts interpreting the section to allow
such agreements, there is disagreement over what law, state or
federal, should provide the basis for evaluating their scope.3e
The majority of courts faced with the issue of CERCLA liabil-
ity releases have interpreted the language of section 107(e) to
permit the use of contractual transfers of liability as a defense
to private actions for cleanup cost recovery and contribution. 40
The leading case on the question is Mardan CoM. v. CG.C Mu-
sc, Ltd. 1 In Mardan, the Ninth Circuit held that a settlement
agreement in which the buyer of a contaminated site released
the seller from all claims related "in any way" to the sale
agreement barred the buyer's action against the seller for con-
tribution under CERCLA.42
other from... CERCLA liability"); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693
F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (CERCLA liability not sufficient for the re-
covery of clean-up costs between private parties where one such party has re-
leased the other from its CERCLA liability).
All courts have, however, agreed that a contractual agreement purporting
to transfer liability between potentially responsible parties is never effective to
protect the transferring party from direct government action. See, ag.,
Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1459.
One court has taken the position that § 107(e) does not even apply to con-
tractual releases. See Waterville Indus. v. First Hartford Corp., No. 89-0209-B
(D. Me. Jan. 28, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file, at 10). The section
specifically encompasses "indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agree-
ment[s] and conveyance[s]." Although the overwhelming majority of courts
presume that contractual releases fall under the heading "similar agreement
and conveyance," the Waterville court held that the contractual agreement at
issue was a release of cause of action "relating to the real estate - not an in-
demnification, hold harmless or similar agreement such as is prohibited in
some circumstances by CERCLA [§ 107(e)]." Id.
39. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
40. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1459; Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 753 F.
Supp. 1248, 1253 (D.N.J. 1991); Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F.
Supp. 1022, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Rodenbeck, 742 F. Supp. at 1456; Southland
Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 1000; Versatile Metals, 693 F. Supp. at 1573; Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285,1294-95
(E.D. Pa. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285,1289 (D.
Minn. 1987).
41. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
42. Id. at 1452. The plaintiff had purchased a musical instrument manu-
facturing plant from the defendant in 1980. For several years prior to the sale
of the plant, the defendant had dumped hazardous wastes into a settling pond
on the site. Id. When the plaintiff acquired the site, it continued to use the
settling pond for the same purpose. Both plaintiff and defendant were aware
at the time of sale that the settling pond contained hazardous wastes and that
it was subject to regulatory activity by the EPA. Id. at 1456. In 1981, after a
series of disputes had arisen, the parties entered into an "Agreement of Gen-
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In reaching this conclusion, the Mardan court never con-
sidered whether section 107(e) absolutely prohibited contrac-
tual transfers of CERCLA liability between potentially
responsible parties. 43 Assuming it permitted them,4 ' the court
concentrated its analysis on whether federal or state law should
govern the effect of the release.45 Finding no clear indication of
congressional preference,46 the court applied the three-part test
promulgated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kimbell
Foods47 and decided that state law should provide the rule of
decision.48 Accordingly, the court evaluated the release under
eral Settlement and Release," under which the defendant paid the plaintiff
$995,000 in settlement of all claims arising out of the purchase agreement.
Two years later, the EPA brought an enforcement action against the plaintiff
requiring the plaintiff to clean up the settling pond. The plaintiff then filed
suit against the defendant to recover part of the cleanup costs. Id.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 1458. The court simply stated that "section 107(e)(1) expressly
preserves agreements to insure, to hold harmless, or to indemnify a party held
liable under section 107(a)." Id. The court appears to have completely disre-
garded the first sentence of § 107(e)(1). The court's interpretation provides
that potentially responsible parties are free to contract among themselves with
respect to CERCLA liability, but "responsible parties will be fully liable to the
government regardless of the . .. contracts they have entered into." Id. at
1459.
45. Id at 1458. The court noted that § 107(e)(1) "expressly preserves
agreements to insure, to hold harmless, or to indemnify a party held liable
under § 107(a)." Id. Because these agreements would normally be governed
under state law, the court reasoned, by preserving them Congress may have
expressed an intent to preserve the associated body of state law. The court
concluded, however, that this intent was not "entirely clear." Id.
46. Congress may specify that state law should provide the content of the
federal law. See De Sylvia v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
47. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). Briefly, this test involves asking (1) whether the
issue requires a "nationally uniform body of law;," (2) whether the application
of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program; and
(3) whether the application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial rela-
tionships predicated on state law. See Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458.
48. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458. Applying the first prong of the Kimbell
Foods test, the court concluded that a uniform body of law was not required,
because parties looking to sell their assets "will normally look to state law to
interpret their indemnification provisions." Id. at 1458. Applying the second
prong of Kimbell Foods, the court held that the application of state law to in-
terpret the agreements transferring CERCLA liability would not frustrate the
statute's objectives, because regardless of any private contractual agreement
the parties would remain liable to the government. Id. at 1459. Finally, the
court found that a uniform federal rule governing contractual transfers of
CERCLA liability would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state
law. The court reasoned that a seller will normally desire to "wipe its slate
clean" through the use of a general release or indemnification agreement,
thereby relieving itself of the "headaches" of the old business and allowing it
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New York law and found it enforceable.49
Other courts that have considered the issue of contractual
transfers of CERCLA liability have implicitly held that the sec-
ond sentence of section 107(e)(1) completely negates the first
sentence, thereby permitting parties to bargain over CERCLA
liability under all circumstances.e None of these courts dis-
cussed the language of section 107(e), nor did they cite the leg-
islative history of the provision.5' Instead, these courts appear
to have based their interpretation on a public policy that parties
should be able to distribute the risk of CERCLA liability be-
cause of the far-reaching nature of that liability.5 2 Recently,
an Ohio federal district court, confronted with facts similar to
those in Mardan, held that section 107(e) expressly prohibits
to move on to new ventures. I& at 1460; see infra notes 13850 and accompany-
ing text.
For a case directly contrary to Mardan, see Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal,
Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D.N.J. 1991). Mobay holds that Kimbell Foods re-
quires the formulation of a uniform federal rule regarding the validity of
CERCLA liability releases. Id. The court adopted a rule similar to the one
suggested by Judge Reinhardt in his Mardan dissent: In order to preclude re-
covery of response costs under CERCLA, there must be a clear provision in
the release contract that allocates those risks to one of the parties. I at 1260.
49. Applying New York law, the court concluded that the parties had
clearly intended the settlement agreement to include all possible claims re-
lated to the property, including possible claims under CERCLA. Mardan, 804
F.2d at 1460-61. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized the impor-
tance of the parties' knowledge of the settling pond and its toxic content, the
fact that the parties specifically addressed the possibility that corrective action
would be required, and the fact that CERCLA had been in existence for over a
year at the time the parties executed the settlement agreement. I&
50. This reasoning allows courts to proceed as if the provision does not ex-
ist; the words are just surplusage. See, e.g., Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord,
822 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1987) (no mention of § 107(e)'s applicability to issue of
indemnity agreement purporting to transfer CERCLA liability); Versatile
Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (CERCLA's
liability provisions do not abrogate party's contractual rights); Chemical Waste
Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1294-95 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (language of § 107(e)(1) authorizes release agreements between
owner/operators and generators); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump 'Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Minn. 1987) ("a person that is liable under the terms of
[§ 107(a)] may by agreement be held harmless or indemnified by another
party").
51. It is not inconceivable, however, that § 107(e) was not part of either
parties' briefs in these cases and, as a result, never entered into the court's
consideration. The legislative history of § 107(e)(1), while quite limited, is illu-
minating as to the provision's meaning. See infra notes 58, 96-106 and accom-
panying text.
52. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (reviewing how other courts have dealt with purported transfers of
CERCLA liability).
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the transfer of CERCLA liability between potentially responsi-
ble parties. In AM International v. International Forging
Equipment,53 conflicts in the sale of a metal plating plant re-
sulted in an agreement under which the seller gave the buyer a
release of all claims in return for which the buyer paid a cash
settlement to the seller.54 Later, when the buyer refused to
obey an EPA order to clean up toxic wastes at the plant site,
the EPA looked to the seller to undertake the cleanup.ss The
seller then sued the buyer for contribution.6
The AM International court examined the language and
legislative history of section 107(e) more extensively than any
court that has thus far considered the issue.57 Finding section
107(e)(1) internally inconsistent, the court turned to the legisla-
tive history to "construe section 107(e) coherently."' ss It con-
53. 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
54. Id. at 526. The parties' relationship began in 1979 when AM Interna-
tional sold the plant site to principals of International Forging, then leased
part of it back. In 1982, AM International informed the principals of Interna-
tional Forging that it would discontinue operations at the site when its lease
ran out that fall. The parties then entered into an agreement whereby Inter-
national Forging was to purchase AM International's equipment and supplies.
The contractual relationship between the parties ended in 1984 when Interna-
tional Forging paid AM International $2.3 million as accord and satisfaction,
and AM gave a release of all claims. Id.
55. Id. AM International had the cleanup work completed at a cost of
$350,000. Id
56. Id.
57. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022,-1026 (N.D.
Cal. 1990).
58. AM Intl, 743 F. Supp. at 528. The court first examined a previous
Senate draft of § 107(e):
No indemnification, hold harmless, conveyance, or similar agree-
ment shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of a
facility, or from any person who may be liable for a release under this
section, to any other person the liability imposed under this section:
Provided, That this subsection shall not apply to a transfer in a bona
fd e conveyance of a facility or site (1) between two parties not affili-
ated with each other in any way, (2) where there has been adequate
disclosure in writing ... of all facts and conditions (including poten-
tial economic consequences) material to such liability, and (3) to a
transferor who can provide assurances offinancial responsibility and
continuity of operation consistent with the degree and duration of
risks associated with such facility or site.
S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4(i), 126 CONG. REc. 30,984 (1980) (emphasis ad-
ded), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIV HISTORY, supra note 2, at 275. From this
draft the court inferred that the provision, at least as originally conceived, dis-
favored releases except under strict conditions. AM Intl, 743 F. Supp. at 528.
This inference, the court found, was further bolstered by the content of an ex-
change between two Senate sponsors of the bill, which took place during the
Senate debate leading to the final draft of the provision. The exchange took
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cluded that although section 107(e) allows the transfer of
liability between a potentially responsible party and an indem-
nifier that was not otherwise liable, such as an insurance com-
pany, Congress intended to prohibit the contractual transfer of
CERCLA liability between two or more potentially responsible
persons.5 9 The court further noted that this interpretation
squares firmly with CERCLA's policy of encouraging clean-up
initiative on the part of responsible parties.60 Because a con-
tractual agreement would not insulate a party from a direct ac-
tion for clean-up costs by the government,61 a policy of allowing
such agreements as defenses to contribution suits would under-
cut this policy.62 Parties would be less likely to take initiative
if an indemnity or release were in effect among them because
the agreement would confine the costs to any party that
acted. s
H. RESOLVING THE INCONSISTENCIES OF
SECTION 107(e)
The disparity of result in the cases dealing with contractual
transfers of CERCLA liability is undoubtedly the result of the
place between Senator Randolph, a chief sponsor of S. 1480, and Senator
Cannon:
Mr. CANNON: Section 107(e)(1) prohibits transfer of liability from
the owner or operator of a facility to other persons through indemni-
fication, hold harmless, or similar agreements or conveyances. Lan-
guage is also included indicating that this prohibition on the transfer
of liability does not act as a bar to such agreements, in particular to
insurance agreements. The net effect is to make the parties to such
an agreement, which would not have been liable under this section,
also liable to the degree specified in the agreement.
Mr. RANDOLPH: That is correct.
126 CONG. REC. 30,984 (1980).
59. AM IntY, 743 F. Supp. at 529. The court held that the first sentence of
subsection 107(e)(1) absolutely prohibits the effectiveness of any agreement to
relieve a party from liability, the second sentence does not relieve a party from
liability, but recognizes contracts with others not already liable under the act
to provide additional liability by way of insurance or indemnity. This interpre-
tation, the court reasoned, is supported by subsection 107(e)(2); because the
second sentence of subsection 107(e)(1) authorizes a limited right to contract
regarding liability, and because subsection 107(e)(2) expressly directs that such
contracts may not limit suits against persons liable under the act, the manifest
conclusion is that such contracts cannot be enforced to prevent suits between
potentially responsible parties under the Act. I(
60. I&
61. Id- To this extent, the court expressly agreed with the Mardan court.
62. AM Int, 743 F. Supp. at 529.
63. Id- For an extensive discussion of this point, see infra notes 108-16
and accompanying text.
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ambiguity of section 107(e)(1) itself.64 The Mardan court
glossed over the section's inconsistencies and instead focused on
the issue of whether state or federal law should be used to eval-
uate agreements purporting to transfer CERCLA liability.66 In
doing so, the court ignored the possibility that Congress's true
intent was present within the strained language of the provi-
sion.66 Other courts, apparently finding section 107(e)(1) hope-
lessly flawed, have proceeded as if it did not exist.6 7
The AM International court, however, confronted section
107(e)(1) head on.66 By giving greater emphasis to the language
and legislative history of the provision, the court interpreted
the provision as prohibiting the contractual transfer of CER-
CLA liability between potentially responsible parties.
6 9
The AM International court's conclusion is appealing.70
Unlike previous attempts at interpreting section 107(e)(1), the
AM International formulation eliminates the section's facial in-
consistency by giving independent meaning to both sentences.71
The court's analysis, however, is less convincing than its conclu-
sion. Jeopardizing its persuasiveness is its heavy reliance on a
legislative history consisting only of one prior version of section
107(e)72 and a colloquy between two Senators.73 As argued be-
64. See supra notes 34-63 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
66. I&
67. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
68. AM Intl, 743 F. Supp. at 525; see supra notes 53-63 and accompanying
text.
69. AM Intl, 743 F. Supp. at 530; see supra notes 57-63 and accompanying
text.
70. At least one court agrees with this sentiment. See Jones-Hamilton Co.
v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (following the
Mardan precedent, the court stated that "[a]lIthough AM International's cita-
tion to the legislative history has persuasive appeal, AM International ... is
not the law of the Ninth Circuit").
71. The interpretation comports with the well settled principle of statu-
tory interpretation that all parts of a statute, if at all possible, should be given
effect. See Jarecki v. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1961); United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955). A statute should not be interpreted so
as to render one part inoperative, superfluous or insignificant. McClanahan v.
Vernan (In re Gasteiger), 471 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). According to
the AM International court's interpretation, the first sentence of § 107(e) dis-
allows contractual transfers of CERCLA liability between potentially respon-
sible parties, while the second sentence allows CERCLA liability transfers
between a potentially responsible party and a party not potentially responsi-
ble. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 58.
73. Id Courts and commentators have recently become more selective in
their reliance on statements by sponsors. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRIcKEY, LEGIS-
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low, the AM International court could have strengthened its
reasoning by a closer analysis of the statutory language itself.
A. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The first sentence of section 107(e)(1) provides that no
agreement will be effective to transfer from "any person who
may be liable for a release or threat of release under this sec-
tion, to any other person the liability imposed under this sec-
tion."74 To determine the meaning of this sentence, one must
define the scope of the '"iability imposed under this section."75
The "section" referred to is section 107(a).76 Under section
107(a), a potentially responsible party is liable for the costs of
remedial or removal action incurred by the EPA or any other
person.77 Accordingly, the "liability" that the sentence pre-
vents a potentially responsible party from transferring by way
of contractual agreement is the affirmative obligation to con-
tribute to response costs incurred by the EPA or any other
person.78
The first sentence of section 107(e)(1) thus prohibits the
contractual transfer of liability between two potentially respon-
sible parties. To illustrate, recall the earlier example involving
the two tire manufacturers, Goodstone and Fireyear.79
Fireyear, the present owner of the tire manufacturing plant,
executed an agreement purporting to indemnify and release
Goodstone, the former owner, from all past and future liability
with respect to the site. 0 Subsequently, Fireyear voluntarily
responded to hazardous waste problems on the site, thereby in-
curring heavy response costs.8 ' Under section 107(a), Good-
stone, as a potentially responsible party,8 2 is liable to Fireyear
LATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 735 (1988). This is
due to their recognition that sponsors or their friends might have incentive to
distort the legislative history through "planned colloquies." Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988); see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988).
76. Id § 9607(a); see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
77. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) (1988); supra notes 17-24 and ac-
companying text.
78. "[O]wner or operator of any vessel or facility or from any person who
may be liable for a release or threat of release," 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988),
is a comprehensive way of saying "potentially responsible party." See supra
notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
80. I&
81. I&
82. Id
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for at least its proportionate share of those costs.86 If, however,
the prior indemnity and release agreement bars enforcement of
that liability, Goodstone will have effectively transferred its lia-
bility to Fireyear,84 directly contrary to the express prohibition
on such transfers contained in the first sentence of section
107(e)(1).85
In all suits for contribution between potentially responsible
parties, one party will be liable to the other for response costs
under section 107(a). 86 Because any agreement whereby one
party indemnifies or releases the other will effect a transfer of
that liability,87 the unavoidable conclusion is that the first sen-
tence of section 107(e)(1) prohibits enforcing such agreements
between potentially responsible parties.86
The second sentence of section 107(e)(1) provides that
"[n]othing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure,
hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any
liability under this section."89 Admittedly, nothing in this sen-
tence expressly limits or defines the relative parties.9° In ac-
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988); see supra notes 17-24 and accompany-
ing text.
84. Fireyear, unable to enforce Goodstone's liability, will instead be forced
to assume that liability by financing the entire cost of the response.
85. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
86. The plaintiff in a contribution suit seeks to recover all or part of
either the cost of its own response action or the amount it has paid or will
have to pay for response actions taken by another party. See generally Garber,
supra note 29 (discussing the equitable considerations relevant to contribution
under CERCLA).
87. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
88. Clearly, because every indemnity, hold harmless or release agreement
between potentially responsible parties would, if given effect, transfer the lia-
bility imposed by § 107(a), all such agreements are prohibited under the first
sentence of § 107(e)(1).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988); see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying
text.
90. A potentially significant clue as to Congress's intent, however, is the
inclusion of the word "insure" in the second sentence, but not the first. This
usage supports the proposition that Congress envisioned different parties to
agreements under the second sentence as opposed to the first.
The role of liability insurance in CERCLA recovery actions is a major
topic of discussion today. See, e.g., Abraham, Environmental Liability and the
Limits of Insurance, 88 CoLum. L. REv. 942 (1988) (exploring the relationship
between environmental liability and liability insurance); Comment, Insurance
Coverage for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: The Comprehensive General Liabil-
ity Insurance Policy Defined, 39 CATH. U.L. REv. 196 (1989) (analyzing the di-
vision of authority regarding coverage for environmental liabilities); Note,
Environmental Cleanup Costs and Insurance: Seeking a Solution, 24 GA. L.
REV. 705 (1990) (examining the role insurance companies play in forwarding
the goals of environmental protection policies); Note, CERCLA Cleanup Costs
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cordance with the foregoing interpretation of the first sentence
of the section,91 however, it logically follows that the second
sentence permits agreements under which an outside party (a
party not potentially responsible under section 107(a)) under-
takes to insure or indemnify a potentially responsible party.
Such an agreement does not run afoul of the express lan-
guage of the first sentence of section 107(e)(1). For example, if
Allwaste, an outside party, insured or indemnified Goodstone,
Goodstone itself, although insured, would still be liable to
Fireyear. 92 The agreement between Goodstone and Allwaste
would not transfer the liability imposed by section 107(a) on
Goodstone and Fireyear.93 A close reading of the statutory lan-
guage, therefore, demonstrates that the AM Interational94
court was correct: Section 107(e) prohibits the contractual
transfer of liability between potentially responsible parties, but
allows for insurance or indemnity agreements between a poten-
tially responsible party and an outside party.95
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of section 107(e), though meager,
supports the interpretation just derived from its language.9
This history consists of a version of section 107(e)97 appearing
Under Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: Property Damage
or Economic Damage, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 1169 (1988) (arguing that environ-
mental relief under CERCIA constitutes restitution, not "property damage"
within the meaning of comprehensive general liability insurance policies);
Note, The Pollution Exclusion in the Comprehensive General Liability Insur-
ance Policy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 897 (discussing the legal effect of standard
pollution exclusion clauses contained in general comprehensive liability insur-
ance policies).
91. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
92. Goodstone would remain subject to direct action by Fireyear, even
though Goodstone could recoup any losses from Allwaste.
93. Goodstone would remain liable to Fireyear under § 107(a), and
AlIwaste would be liable to Goodstone under their insurance agreement.
94. AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio
1990); see supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
95. AM Intl, 743 F. Supp. at 529; see supra notes 57-63 and accompanying
text. As the AM International court notes, support for this conclusion is also
found in § 107(e)(2), which specifically directs that § 107(e)(1) does not bar
causes of action by potentially responsible parties against any other person for
subrogation or contribution. 743 F. Supp. at 529; see supra notes 59-60 and ac-
companying text.
o" 96. For the complete text of the legislative history of § 107(e), see supra
note 58.
* 97. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 30,900 (1980); see 1 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 495. For the text of the provision, see supra
note 58.
1991] 1589
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
in an earlier draft of CERCLA and a colloquy occurring during
the Senate debate considering amendments transforming that
draft into its present form.98
The earlier draft of section 107(e) indicates Congress's
early apprehension concerning the transfer of CERCLA liabil-
ity by use of indemnity and release agreements, permitting
them only under strict conditions.9 The Senate subsequently
amended that draft to read as it now does.'00 During the ensu-
ing Senate debate on these amendments, an exchange took
place between Senator Cannon and Senator Randolph, a spon-
sor of the bill.'0 ' During that exchange, Senator Cannon con-
strued section 107(e)(1) as making parties "which would not
have been liable under [section 107(a)], also liable to the degree
specified in the [indemnity, hold harmless, etc.] agreement."'10 2
Senator Cannon went on to state that as he understood it, sec-
tion 107(e)(1) was "designed to eliminate situations where the
owner or operator of a facility uses its economic power to force
the transfer of its liability to other persons, as a cost of doing
business, thus escaping its liability under the act all together
[sic].' 03  Senator Randolph affirmed Senator Cannon's
interpretation.1' 4
The most significant aspect of the Senators' construction of
section 107(e)(i) is their belief that it would allow agreements
to transfer liability only to parties that were not already liable
under section 107(a).105 That interpretation, as well as the col-
lective trepidation concerning contractual transfers of CER-
98. 126 CONG. REC. 30,984 (1980); see 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
2, at 764; supra note 58 and accompanying text.
99. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 30,900 (1980); see 1 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 495; supra note 58 and accompanying text.
100. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 564; AM Int'l v. Interna-
tional Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D. Ohio 1990); supra note 58
and accompanying text.
101. 126 CONG. REC. 30,984 (1980); 1 LEGISLATivE HISTORY, supra note 2, at
764. One of the Senators, Senator Randolph, was the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works and a chief sponsor of the bill
that became CERCLA. See AM Int'l, 743 F.Supp. at 528-29; 1 LEGisLATVE HI--
TORY, supra note 2, at 564; Grad, supra note 2, at 21; supra note 58 and accom-
panying text.
102. 126 CONG. REC. 30,984 (1980); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at
764.
103. 126 CONG. REC. 30,984 (1980). Senator Cannon's concern underscores
Congress's determination to ensure that those responsible for hazardous waste
contamination bear the costs of cleanup. See supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
104. 126 CONG. REC. 30,984 (1980).
105. IMi This indicates that, at least as Senator Cannon and Senator Ran-
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CLA liability that both Senator Cannon's further remarks and
the earlier draft of section 107(e) illustrate, bolster this Note's
construction of the provision.1°6
C. FURTHERING CERCLA's GOAIz
Perhaps most importantly, interpreting section 107(e) as
prohibiting any contractual transfer of liability between poten-
tially responsible parties is most consistent with the purposes
and objectives of CERCLA.'1 7 One of CERCLA's primary
objectives is to provide incentives for prompt, private
cleanup.108 Although CERCLA authorizes the government to
perform necessary cleanup and then recover its costs from re-
sponsible parties,1 °9 this action is a last recourse taken only af-
ter voluntary private action fails." 0 The purpose of CERCLA's
right of private cost recovery is to avoid government involve-
ment by encouraging potentially responsible parties to clean up
quickly and then secure contribution from other responsible
parties."' The current owner or operator of a site is typically
in the best position to take such action.n 2 If a contractual
dolph understood it, § 107(e) did not allow contractual transfers of liability be-
tween potentially responsible parties.
106. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 5 and accompanying text Voluntary action is vital to
CERCLA's success. "[Tihe government's ability to monitor numerous sites
and initiate cleanups on a nationwide basis is constrained by limited re-
sources." Mobay Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D.N.J.
1991) (citing Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1465 (9th Cir.
1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)). The EPA also recognizes that government
initiated cleanup "will not be sufficient to accomplish CERCLA's goals, and
that voluntary cleanups are essential to a successful program for cleanup of
the nation's hazardous waste sites." 50 Fed. Reg. 5034 (1985); see also United
States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (D. Del. 1986) ("a review
of CERCLA's legislative history shows one of the Act's principle goals to be
the achievement of expeditious response to environmental hazards through
voluntary compliance by responsible parties...") (emphasis in original); Gaba,
supra note 24, at 183 (CERCLA's private cause of action provides parties with
a "powerful incentive to respond to hazardous waste problems without prior
government action. Private parties who voluntarily undertake hazardous
waste cleanups may be able to recoup their expenses.").
109. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
110. See Note, supra note 30, at 1472; see also supra notes 17-33 and accom-
'panying text (providing an overview of CERCLA).
in. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
M. 112. See SENATE COmm. ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRON-
MENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE AcT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1980) (current owners or operators are in the best position to control the risks
because, "they have more knowledge about the risks inherent in their wastes
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [
transfer of liability prohibits a current owner or operator from
obtaining contribution from other potentially responsible par-
ties, he will have little incentive to act.- 3 The current owner
will be more inclined to wait for the government to perform
the cleanup, because the government can then apportion its
costs among all potentially responsible parties." 4 In that case,
the owner or operator would be required to pay only its share
rather than all the costs., 1 Because the statute seeks to
achieve voluntary private action, such a result would be aber-
rant to CERCLA's purposes."16
Additionally, Congress passed CERCLA with the express
intention of placing the burden of cleanup on those responsible
for improper disposal." 7 By imposing liability on both present
and past owners and operators of contaminated sites," 8 Con-
gress intended to foreclose the possibility of any escape from li-
ability." 9 Allowing contractual transfers of liability between
and how to avoid them, and they determine whether and how to dispose of
these wastes.. ."); see also Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454,
1464 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("Ordinarily, the current opera-
tor... is the party best able to respond quickly and efficiently... to perform
or arrange for the clean-up, even if it did not create the problem.").
113. See Mobay Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 14, 1253-54
(D.N.J. 1991) (citing Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1465 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)) (the
incentive for voluntary cleanup could be eliminated if an operator has waived
its right to cost recovery); see also AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip.,
743 F. Supp. 525, 529 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (CERCLA's primary policy is encour-
agement of cleanup on the part of responsible parties; permitting defenses to
contribution would undercut this policy); supra notes 60-63 and accompanying
text.
114. See generally Note, supra note 30 (discussing in depth the liability pro-
visions of CERCLA and suggesting that in order to achieve the fairest appor-
tionment of cleanup costs, a potentially responsible party must spread the
liability among the greatest number of possible contributors to the hazardous
waste problem).
115. Pursuant to § 106(a), a party is subject to substantial fines for failing
to comply with an EPA cleanup directive. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988).
Because average site cleanup costs are approximately $30 million, however,
the fines would be unlikely to have much deterrent effect. See SuRvEys AND
INVESTIGATIONS STAFF OF HousE Comm. ON APPROPRIATIONS, REPORT ON THE
STATUS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S SUPERFUND PROGRAM,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in Practical Approaches to Reduce Envi-
ronmental Cleanup Costs, 317 P.L.I. REAL EST. L. & PRAC. 405, 424 (1988).
116. "CERCLA's goals must serve as a constant beacon for interpreters;
otherwise, they may kill CERCLA with kindness, intending the best, but ulti-
mately impairing CERCLA's functionality." Note, supra note 6, at 1241. See
supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
118. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); supra notes 17-33
and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
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potentially responsible parties would allow parties to under-
mine that intent.
Finally, the need for national uniformity in dealing with
hazardous waste sites was also a prominent factor in the pas-
sage of CERCLA.120 As one court stated, "[o]ne can hardly im-
agine a federal program more demanding of national
uniformity than environmental protection."'12 1 National uni-
formity is essential to best accomplish CERCLA's goals of pro-
moting quick, voluntary cleanup and placing the financial
burden on the responsible parties. 2 2 For example, a typical
hazardous waste site will consist of waste produced by compa-
nies operating in several different states.n2S Under an interpre-
tation of section 107(e) allowing contractual transfers of
liability between potentially responsible parties, indemnity or
release agreements between those companies will likely be con-
strued under state law.124 If so, that state law would inevitably
produce disparate results,m25 or at the least, uncertainty in the
120. Representative Florio, CERCLA's house sponsor, specifically ad-
dressed the question of uniformity. 'To insure the development of a uniform
rule of law, and to discourage business[es] dealing in hazardous substances
from locating primarily in states with more lenient laws, the bill will en-
courage the further development of a Federal common law in [the CERCLA
liability] area of law." 126 CONG. REC. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3,1980); 1 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 778.
121. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D.
Mass. 1987) (fashioning a uniform federal rule for questions of piercing the
corporate veil in parent-subsidiary liability cases under CERCIA). Moreover,
the recognition that response to hazardous waste problems at the state level
was generally inadequate was also a driving force in the development of CER-
CLA. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (citing 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6142); see also SENATE
COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE AcT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980) ("the legal
mechanisms in the States .. . are generally inadequate for redressing toxic
substances-related harms").
122. See supra notes 5, 108-19 and accompanying text.
123. Id. (citing W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 619-97
(1977)). The pollution of air, ground water, surface water, and land entails po-
tential interstate problems. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808; see infra note 149
and accompanying text.
124. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1460 (9th Cir.
1986) (construing release agreement under state law); see also Rodenbeck v.
Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1454 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (same);
Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (D.N.J. 1988)
(same); Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp.
1285, 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (same). But see Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,
753 F. Supp. 1248, 1249 (D.N.J. 1991) (fashioning a uniform federal rule to gov-
ern contractual transfers of CERCLA liability).
125. Congress, in enacting CERCLA, was concerned with varying stan-
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minds of the parties. 26 Uniform treatment of CERCLA liabil-
ity disputes is necessary to prevent the vagaries of divergent
state laws from adversely affecting the incentive for voluntary
cleanup and frustrating Congress's intent to place the burden of
that cleanup on the responsible parties.m27
D. DISTURBING UNSETrLED EXPECTATIONS
Properly interpreted, section 107(e) prohibits contractual
transfers of CERCLA liability between potentially responsible
parties. 2 At least one court, however, avoided this result for
fear that such a uniform federal law would upset settled expec-
dards reflected in different state laws. See SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT
AND PuBLIc WoRcs, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT TO CONGRESS, INJURIES
AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF
LEGAL REMEDIES 25-146 (Comm. Print 1983). A liability standard that varies
in different states would undermine CERCLA's policies by encouraging illegal
dumping in states with lax liability laws. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809 (cit-
ing 126 CONG. REc. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1990)). The varying standards of
state laws could allow responsible parties to escape liability, contrary to Con-
gress's intent. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
Without a uniform federal standard for evaluating contractual agreements
purporting to transfer CERCLA liability, courts are likely to reach their con-
clusions based largely on particular factual circumstances or issues of contract
interpretation preset in a given case. See, e.g., Marmon Group, Inc. v.
Rexnord, Inc., 822 F.2d 31, 34 (7th Cir. 1987) (indemnity agreement executed
in 1974 could not have anticipated the passage of CERCLA seven years later);
Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1461 (effectiveness of release as to CERCLA liability
turning upon issue of whether parties discussed environmental hazards prior
to execution); Jones Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1027
(N.D. Cal. 1990) (to be effective, California law does not require that indem-
nity agreement executed in 1970 specifically mention CERCLA liability);
Weigmann & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957, 961 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (effect of "as is" clause turning in issue of whether parties were aware or
could have anticipated CERCLA liability and whether the language of the
agreement was meant to be "comprehensive").
126. Parties looking to diverse state law to evaluate their contractual
agreements would be uncertain as to their liability exposure. Such uncer-
tainty may delay or even preclude voluntary cleanup. In contrast, under the
proposed interpretation of § 107(e), once a party determines its responsibility
under § 107(a), they can quickly ascertain the validity of their agreements. See
supra notes 17-24, 74-94 and accompanying text; iifra notes 141-50 and accom-
panying text.
127. See Mobay, 753 F. Supp. at 1253-54 (citing Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1464
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("The subject matter dealt with in CERCLA is
easily distinguished from areas of primarily state concern, such as domestic re-
lations or real property rights, where state law was applied and there was no
overriding interest in nationwide uniformity.").
128. See supra notes 74-127 and accompanying text.
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tations predicated on state law.129
In Mardan Corp. v. CG.C Music, Ltd.,' 30 the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the application of a uniform federal rule gov-
erning the validity of contractual transfer of CERCLA liability
would unduly disrupt the function of agreements formulated
on the basis of state law.' 3 ' The court reasoned that the seller
of a site or company will generally desire to "wipe its slate
clean, making some general release a condition of the sale so
that the seller can relieve itself of the headaches as well as the
benefits of the old business and move on to new ventures."'132
To do so, the court asserted, sellers and buyers will normally
look to state law to govern their agreements.1 3' A uniform fed-
eral rule governing contractual transfers of liability, the court
concluded, would create confusion and uncertainty in commer-
cial relationships because buyers and sellers would be unsure
about which body of law governs' i 3
Critics of this Note's proposal could argue that the Mardan
analysis demonstrates the proposal's flaw: upsetting the expec-
tations of parties to contracts transferring CERCLA liability.
This argument, however, is not persuasive. First, because Con-
gress passed CERCLA with the express intention of placing the
burden of cleanup on those responsible for improper dispo-
sal,'3 whether or not sellers of contaminated sites desire to
"wipe the slate clean"''i is irrelevant. By imposing liability on
both present and past owners and operators of contaminated
sites,'37 CERCLA forecloses the possibility of any such escape
from liability.138 This is especially true because potentially re-
sponsible parties will remain vulnerable to direct actions'by the
government regardless of any agreements with other poten-
tially responsible parties. 39 In this sense, a uniform federal
129. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986); see
supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
130. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
131. Id at 1460. Although the Mardan court's analysis pertained to the
question of whether federal or state law should govern the effectiveness of
contractual transfers of liability, it is nonetheless germane in the immediate
context. See supm notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
132. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1460.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
136. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1460.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); see supra notes 17-24 and accompanying
text.
138. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
139. If the government undertakes a cleanup action, potentially responsible
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rule prohibiting contractual transfers of CERCLA liability
would not disturb the settled expectations of parties to such
agreements simply because those expectations are not settled
until the government says they are.i'0
Second, it is unrealistic to assert that parties will be unsure
which body of law governs their agreements 14 ' CERCLA is a
much publicized program of national scope.i 4 Parties involved
in the transfer of sites possibly contaminated with hazardous
waste are likely to be well aware of CERCLA's implications i '
Moreover, transactions involving potentially contaminated sites
will probably involve several other aspects of CERCLA, all of
which must be considered in view of applicable federal law.144
Certainly parties to such transactions will also give serious con-
sideration to their potential liability should the government
take it upon itself to clean up the site and sue them directly for
cost recovery. 45 In that case, the uniform federal standards of
CERCLA section 107(a) would govern their liability.'1 In light
parties are relieved of their liability to the government only after the govern-
ment formally releases them. See Note, supra note 30, at 1483-88.
140. See id.
141. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458.
142. Since the 1960s, Americans have become increasingly aware of the
hazardous waste dilemma. W. RODGERS, supra note 123, at 2. Searching the
NEXIS database for mention of either CERCLA or Superfund yields in excess
of 23,000 articles.
143. See Note, supra note 30, at 1475 ("Any person linked by even a tenu-
ous thread to a site where hazardous wastes have been released should assess
its liability promptly. If the person qualifies as a PRP [potentially responsible
party] under section 107, it should assume that it may be held jointly and sev-
erally liable for cleanup costs.").
144. See Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D.N.J.
1991) (citing Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1465-66 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)) (docu-
ments covering transaction involving potentially contaminated sites must be
prepared in light of applicable federal law regarding other CERCLA provi-
sions). Under these circumstances, it seems fair to say that a party might be
surprised to find their indemnity or release agreement, unlike all other as-
pects of their CERCLA compliance requirements, not construed under federal
law.
145. See Note, supra note 30, at 1475; see also Kiesche, Facing the Environ-
mental Chill on Acquisitions, CHEM. WEEK, Sept. 21, 1988, at 26 (noting that
both buyers and sellers are apprehensive of property transfers); Kittrell, Big-
ger Liability Risks Alter Business Routines, Bus. INS., Jan. 23, 1989, at 30 (not-
ing that corporations "worry not only about their own environmental
liabilities, but also about the potential liabilities of other companies with
which they might be considering merger or acquisition activity"); Note, supra
note 6, at 1255 ("[e]xpanded successor liability [under CERCLA] greatly dimin-
ishes the value of the tainted assets").
146. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); see supra notes 17-24
and accompanying text.
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of the established rule that federal law governs the release of
federal claims,147 potentially responsible parties attempting to
contractually relieve themselves of CERCLA liability are un-
likely to be surprised to find that federal law governs their
agreements. 148
Finally, many transactions involving potentially contami-
nated sites involve large companies with operations in more
than one state. 49 Far from creating confusion, a uniform fed-
eral law governing contractual transfers of CERCLA liability
would promote certainty on the part of these companies as to
which law governed their agreements. 5°
E. LIFE WITHOUT CONTRACTUAL TRANSFERS OF CERCLA
LIABILITY
Returning to the now familiar hypothetical scenario,' 5 ' the
positive effect of prohibiting contractual transfers of liability
between potentially responsible parties is apparent. Fireyear,
undeterred by the contractual agreement with Goodstone, will
be in a position to move quickly to clean up the tire manufac-
turing plant site. 52 Because the indemnity and release is inef-
fective as to CERCLA liability,' 3 Fireyear knows it will have
the opportunity to apportion its costs with Goodstone.M In
contrast, if the effectiveness of the agreement were uncertain,
as it would be under state law,3' 5 Fireyear might decide that it
is more prudent to refuse to comply with the cleanup order and
wait for the EPA to perform the cleanup and then sue both
parties for recovery of its costs.1' Although this might be a
wise strategy for Fireyear, 157 it contravenes CERCLA's
147. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952);
Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1981).
148. It seems more likely, given that federal law governs all other aspects
of CERCLA, that these parties would be more surprised to find that their
CERCLA release agreements are not governed by federal law.
149. See supra notes 4, 123 and accompanying text.
150. These entities, rather than weeding through various state provisions,
could instead turn to one source to interpret all their agreements.
151. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
153. Per the interpretation proposed by this Note. See supra notes 74-127
and accompanying text.
154. Fireyear can clean up the site and then sue Goodstone under
§ 107(a)(4)(B). See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
155. The validity of the agreement would be uncertain at least until the
matter was litigated. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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purpose. 58
CERCLA will not expire again until December, 1994.159
Until that time, Congress probably will not act to "clean up"
some of the confusing, inconsistent and ambiguous provisions
remaining in the statute.160 Courts should not wait for Con-
gress to act. They should instead interpret section 107(e) to
prevent the contractual transfer of CERCLA liability between
potentially responsible parties. Immediate action would go far
to saving litigants money, courts time, and the statute itself
from interpretations contrary to the intent of Congress.' 6 '
CONCLUSION
In attempting to eliminate the dangers of hazardous
wastes, CERCLA offers a national solution to a nationwide
problem. Contractual transfers of liability between potentially
responsible parties, however, detract from CERCLA's
effectiveness.
This Note argues that the language of CERCLA section
107(e) expressly prohibits the transfer of CERCLA liability be-
tween potentially responsible parties. Such an interpretation is
supported by legislative history and is necessary to further
CERCLA's purposes of promoting quick voluntary cleanup of
hazardous waste sites and holding responsible parties accounta-
ble for the costs.
Joseph A. Sevack
158. See supra notes 5, 116 and accompanying text.
159. See generally Superfund Gets New Lease on Life, supra note 1, at 8
(CERCLA funding is extended through fiscal year 1994); see also Congress
Wraps It Up, supra note 1, at 1 (extension provision added so program would
not "grind to a halt"). During the last reauthorization cycle almost a year
lapsed before Congress passed the SARA amendments. Leifer & Musiker,
Cleaning Up Superfund: 10 Changes to Make During Reauthorization, 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) 915 (Sept. 14, 1990). Considering the embarrassment caused
by the cessation of cleanup efforts, government, environmental groups, and in-
dustry were already preparing for a spirited battle over the form and sub-
stance of the Superfund program. See id. Congress, however, has recently
postponed this battle until at least 1994. See supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
160. See Leifer & Musiker, supra note 159, at 915 (proposing 10 suggested
changes in CERCLA, but not touching on the issue of liability releases). Con-
gress will have its hands full when reauthorization of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act is considered in 1991. See Superfund Gets New Lease
on Life, supra note 1, at 8; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
161. Superfund Gets New Lease on Life, supra note 1, at 8.
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